Winner, Best Appellate Brief in the 2002 Native American Law Student Association Moot Court Competition by Carr, Michelle A. & Hair, Cara
American Indian Law Review
Volume 27 | Number 1
1-1-2002
Winner, Best Appellate Brief in the 2002 Native
American Law Student Association Moot Court
Competition
Michelle A. Carr
Cara Hair
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michelle A. Carr & Cara Hair, Winner, Best Appellate Brief in the 2002 Native American Law Student Association Moot Court Competition,
27 Am. Indian L. Rev. 357 (2002),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol27/iss1/6
SPECIAL FEATURE
WINNER, BEST APPELLATE BRIEF IN THE 2002 NATIVE
AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION MOOT COURT
COMPETITION
Michelle A. Carr* & Cara Hair**
Questions Presented
1. Whether the Tribal Court erred in denying summary judgment to the
Atokan Housing Authority and Atokan Tribal Officials, as sued in their official
and individual capacities, on the basis of sovereign immunity.
2. Whether the Tribal Court correctly denied Appellants' motion for a
preliminary injunction because the power to determine the scope of tribal
membership is vested solely in the sovereign Atokan Nation and because the
Tribal Court has no authority to review membership legislation.
Statement of the Case
A. Statement of the Proceedings Below
Appellants Cynthia Many Horses and Isaac Walker together and on behalf
of their minor son, Tim Walker, commenced suit in the Tribal Court of the
Atokan Indian Nation against Appellees, Atokan Indian Nation Housing
Authority, Atokan Tribal Council in both their official and individual capacities,
Elmer Many Horses, Director of the Atokan Indian Nation Housing Authority,
in both his official and individual capacity, and Anita Lebeaux, Enrollment
Officer of the Atokan Tribe, in both her official and individual capacity. (R.
at 1.) In their Complaint Appellants alleged various violations of the Atokan
Constitution and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and sought declaratory
and injunctive relief. (R. at 1, 7-9.) Appellees responded, asserting as an
affirmative defense that they are immune from suit under the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity. (R. at 20.) Appellants moved for a preliminary injunction
pending the outcome of the proceeding, and Appellees moved for summary
judgment. (R. at 21, 23.) The Tribal Court of the Atokan Indian Nation denied
Appellants' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, granted the Appellees Motion
for Summary Judgment as to the Atokan Indian Nation, and denied the motion
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as to all other Appellees. (R. at 26-27.) Appellants filed an appeal to this Court
based on the denial of the preliminary injunction. (R. at 29.) The Atokan
Indian Nation Housing Authority and the Tribal Officials filed a cross-appeal
insofar as the lower court denied their Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at
31.)
B. Statement of the Facts
The Atokan Indian Nation ("Tribe"), located on the Atokan Indian Reser-
vation, is a sovereign nation federally recognized under the provisions of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. (R. at 2.) As a sovereign, the Tribe's
governing body, the Tribal Council ("Council") is recognized by the United
States as the Tribe's legitimate government. (R. at 2.) The Tribe created the
Council through Article I of the Tribal Constitution. (R. at 2.) The Tribe
provides services to its members, including housing. (R. at 2.) In addition to
these services, members also share in the profits of the Tribes' highly successful
gaming operation. (R. at 2.) This profit sharing is accomplished through a
system of per capita payments to all Tribal members residing on the reservation
or away from the reservation for reasons of school or military service. (R. at
6.) Currently, adult members receive $72,500 annually and a payment increase
to over $150,000 is projected for the 2001 calendar year. (R. at. 6.) Children
receive half of the adult per capita distribution and this is held in trust by the
Tribe until they reach the age of majority. (R. at 6.)
Cynthia Many Horses is a formerly enrolled member of the Tribe. (R. at 2.)
Ms. Many Horses lives in a single family home located at Lot 217 of the
Atokan Manor Housing owned by the Atokan Housing Authority ("Housing
Authority"). (R. at 4.) In June of 1996, in the face of strong traditional
religious and cultural bars to marrying outside of the Atokan people, Ms. Many
Horses married Isaac Walker, a non-Atokan. (R. at 4-5.) Mr. Walker moved
into the home with Ms. Many Horses. (R. at 5.) Ms. Many Horses and Mr.
Walker have a minor son, Tim Walker. (R. at 1.)
Pursuant to Atokan Tribal Resolution 87-9, codified as Section 12-1-5 of the
Atokan Tribal Code ("Code"), Tribal housing is available only to enrolled
members and their families. (R. at 2-3.) The term family is not defined. (R.
at 3.) In exercising his duties as the Director of the Housing Authority,
Appellee Elmer Many Horses undertook in late 1999, to early 2000, to evict
either Isaac Walker or the family from the tribally owned house. (R. at 5.) Mr.
Many Horses sent two letters requesting that either Mr. Walker or the family
vacate the premises. (R. at 5.) Appellants refused to comply and the Housing
Authority commenced no further legal proceedings. (R. at 5.)
In April 2000, Tribal Council Resolution 2000-16 was introduced to replace
the previous Tribal Membership Ordinance. (R. at 5.) Pursuant to Tribal
tradition, the vote on Resolution 2000-16 was deferred until the next meeting
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of the Tribal Council. (R. at 5.) The prior Atokan Membership Ordinance
provided that "any person of one-quarter or more Atokan ancestry shall be
eligible for enrollment in the Atokan Indian Nation if born to parents or a
parent who either resided on the Atokan Indian Reservation or was descended
from an ancestor who resided on the Atokan Indian Reservation on June 1,
1934." See (R. at 5.); Atokan Const. art. I, §2. Resolution 2000-16, codified
as Chapter 8-1 of the Code, replaced the prior membership ordinance and
provides:
any person of one-quarter or more ancestry of any of the historic
southern bands of the Atokan people, including the Two Kettles
Band, the Temoak Band, the medicine Lodge Band, and the
Heaven's Gate band, shall be eligible for enrollment in the Atokan
Indian Nation if born to a mother who either resided on the Atokan
Indian reservation or was descended from any ancestor who resided
on the Atokan Indian Reservation on June 1, 1934. For purposes of
this section the Black Kettle Band of the Atokan people shall not
be considered one of the southern bands of the Atokan people.
(R. at 13.)
The recent intermarriage of Tribal members with non-members and the
subsequent increased demand on Tribal resources and entitlements prompted
the new membership ordinance. (R. at 13.) Past lax enrollment practices,
increasing demand on tribal resources, also created the need for new enrollment
requirements. (R. at 13.)
Under the new membership requirements, Ms. Many Horses and her minor
son, Tim Walker, are no longer eligible for enrollment. (R. at. 15.) Pursuant
to Section 8-1-83 of the Code, Anita Lebeaux, the Enrollment Officer of the
Tribe, notified Ms. Many Horses of her removal from the Tribe's rolls. (R. at
5.) Because Ms. Many Horses and her minor son are no longer eligible for
Tribal enrollment, they have no continuing legal right to live in Tribally owned
housing or to receive per capita distributions from the Tribe. (R. at 19.)
Argument
L The Tribal Court Clearly Erred When It Denied Summary Judgment to
the Atokan Housing Authority Because Under the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity, the Housing Authority Is Immune
from Suit and that Immunity Has Not Been Waived.
A. The Atokan Housing Authority Is Immune From Suit Under The Doctrine
Of Sovereign Immunity.
"Indian tribes are distinct, independent political communities retaining their
original natural rights in matters of local self-government." Santa Clara
No. 11
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Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978). "They have [the] power to make
their own substantive law in internal matters and to enforce that law in their
own forums." Id. As distinct political entities, Indian tribes also possess "the
common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers."
Id. at 58.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, long recognized by both tribal and
federal courts in protecting the tribe itself, has been extended by tribal courts
to include agencies of the tribe. Colville Bus. Council v. George, 1 CCAR 15,
34 (Colville Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the tribal business council is
immune from suit). Although this is a case of first impression for the Atokan
Tribal Courts, Colville Tribal Court rulings indicate the importance of
protecting tribal agencies from suit. Id. The Colville Constitution and
sovereign immunity provision of the Colville Tribal Code are worded
identically to the Atokan Constitution and Sovereign Immunity Provision of
the Atokan Tribal Code. See George I CCAR at 32-33; Atokan Const.;
Atokan Code § 1-1-6. Therefore, Colville tribal cases provide persuasive tribal
authority for granting summary judgment to the Housing Authority on the
basis of sovereign immunity.
In George, the plaintiff filed a civil complaint against the Colville Tribal
Business Council alleging, inter alia, violations of his civil rights under the
equal protection guarantees of the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"). Id. at
13. The Colville Confederated Tribes Court of Appeals held that the tribal
business council was analogous to the Congress of the United States and that
there was no meaningful distinction between the business council as sued and
the tribe itself. Id. at 34. Because there was no meaningful distinction, the
court held that the same rules should apply as if the tribe itself were sued.
Consequently, under the Colville Code's sovereign immunity provision, the
business council was immune from suit. ld.
The Atokan Housing Authority is an agency of the Tribe, created by the
Council. (R. at 2-3.) Like the business council in George, the Housing
Authority is responsible for carrying out Tribal business. The only difference
is that the Housing Authority deals solely with housing issues, whereas a
business council conducts more general business. Therefore, the rule
announced in George relating to the sovereign immunity of tribal agencies
should be applied in the case at bar and this Court should find that the
Housing Authority is immune from suit.
Appellants may attempt to argue that a business council is closer to being
the tribe itself than a housing authority is and that George should not apply
to the case at bar. However, this argument is flawed because it ignores the
important function of Indian housing authorities. "The provision of adequate
housing is expressly declared to be a governmental function of Tribal concern
to the tribal council, and the property of the Indian Housing Authority is
[Vol. 27
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deemed to be public property used for essential public and governmental
purposes." Mark K. Ulmer, The Legal Origin and Nature of Indian Housing
Authorities and the HUD Indian Housing Programs, 13 Am. Indian L. Rev.
109, 122 (1988). Being so intricately tied to the government and its purposes,
an Indian housing authority is not sufficiently distinguishable from a business
council so as to make George inapplicable to the case at bar. In fact, other
tribal courts hold that tribal agencies even less related to tribal government
functions enjoy tribal sovereign immunity. See Schock v. Mashantucket
Pequot Gaming Enter., 3 Mash. 258, 26 (Mash. Pequot Tribal Ct. 1999)
(holding that as an "arm of the tribal government" the tribe's gaming
enterprise shared the Tribe's sovereign immunity).
In addition to tribal law that grants sovereign immunity to tribal agencies,
the federal government has recognized that tribal agencies, as an arm of the
tribe, are entitled to sovereign immunity. See Confederated Tribes of The
Colville Reservation Tribal Credit v. White, 139 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that Colville Tribal Credit, as an administrative arm of the
tribe, enjoyed immunity from suit); Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca
Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 898 (2nd Cir. 1996) (holding that Indian tribes and their
governing bodies possess common law immunity from suit); Brown v. Rice,
760 F. Supp. 1459, 1464 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding that tribal council possessed
common-law immunity from suit).
The sovereign immunity of tribal agencies has been held to specifically
include tribal housing authorities. In Weeks Construction, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux
Housing Authority, the Eight Circuit held, "that a housing authority,
established by a tribal council pursuant to its powers of self-government, is a
tribal agency" and that "as an arm of tribal government, a tribal housing
authority possesses attributes of tribal sovereignty, and suits against an agency
like the Housing Authority normally are barred absent a waiver of sovereign
immunity." 797 F.2d 668, 670-671 (8th Cir. 1986). In the present case, the
Council established the Housing Authority pursuant to its powers of self-
government and there has been no express waiver of the Housing Authority's
sovereign immunity. Thus, this case fits squarely within the holding of Weeks
Construction and this Court should grant summary judgment to the Housing
Authority based on its sovereign immunity. See also Wilson v. Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 459 F. Supp. 366, 369 (N.D. 1978)
(holding that suit under the ICRA against tribal housing authority is barred by
sovereign immunity).
B. The Housing Authority's Sovereign Immunity Has Not Been Waived.
Under both tribal and federal law, a waiver of sovereign immunity must be
express, not implied. See Stone v. Somday, 1 CCAR 9, 18 (Colville Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that sovereign immunity must be clearly waived); Santa
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Clara, 436 U.S. at 49 ("It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity
cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed."); Stock W. Corp. v.
Taylor, 942 F.2d 655, 664 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that absent clear waiver by
the tribe, suits against tribes are barred by sovereign immunity); Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp. v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 862 F. Supp.
995, 1001 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (declaring that suits against tribes are barred by
sovereign immunity "absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional
abrogation"); Weeks Constr. 797 F.2d at 671 ("a tribe's waiver of sovereign
immunity must be unequivocally expressed").
Section 1-1-6 of the Code, addressing sovereign immunity, provides:
Except as required by a federal law, or the Constitution of the
Atokan Indian Nation, or as specifically waived by a resolution or
ordinance of the Atokan Tribal Council specifically referring to
such, the Atokan Indian Nation shall be immune from suit in any
civil action, and their officers and employees immune from suit for
any liability arising from the performance of their official duties.
Atokan Code §1-1-6. The Code does not expressly waive the Housing
Authority's immunity, nor does the Constitution or any ordinance of the
Council; all are silent as to sovereign immunity of Tribal agencies. See
Atokan Const.; Atokan Code. Because a waiver of sovereign immunity must
be express, the Code's silence cannot imply a waiver. This Court should find
that the Housing Authority has not waived its sovereign immunity and that the
Housing Authority is entitled to summary judgment.
!i. The Tribal Court Clearly Erred When It Denied Summary
Judgment to the Tribal Officials, as Sued in Their Official
Capacities, Because They Are Immune from Suit Under
the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity.
A. A Tribe's Sovereign Immunity Includes Tribal Officials Acting In Their
Official Capacity.
Tribal courts recognize that tribal sovereign immunity includes tribal
officials acting within their official capacity, so long as those officials act
within the scope of their authority. Stone, I CCAR at 22. In Stone, the
Colville Confederated Tribes Court of Appeals looked at case law and tribal
customary law and concluded that tribal officials enjoy a "qualified immunity"
under Colville Code Section 1.1.6. This section of the Colville Code is
identical to Atokan Code Section 1.1.6, therefore Colville case law, including
Stone, is particularly persuasive in the case at bar. See Stone, 1 CCAR at [
22; Atokan Code § 1-1-6. According to the Colville court, a tribal official is
immune from suit so long as he acts within the scope of his authority and the
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tribe properly delegated that authority to him. Stone, I CCAR at 1 22. See
also Grant v. Grievance Comm. of the Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians of Okla.,
2 TCR A-39, A-40 (Sac & Fox Ct. Indian Offenses 1981) (holding that a
lawsuit may not be brought indirectly against a tribe by suing tribal officers);
Moses v. Joseph, 2 TCR A-51, 54 (Suak-Suiattle Tribal Ct. 1980) (holding
that tribal officers are immune from suit unless they act outside their statutory
limits or act pursuant to an unconstitutional grant of power).
Federal courts also recognize tribal officials' immunity from suit. Fletcher
v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997) ("tribal immunity
protects tribal officials against claims in their official capacity"); Imperial
Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that when tribal officials act in their official capacity and
within the scope of their authority they are immune from suit); Stock W.
Corp., 942 F.2d at 664 (same).
The Fletcher court articulated the main reason for extending tribal immunity
to tribal officials; that is, plaintiffs should not be allowed to evade tribal
immunity by suing tribal officers. 116 F.3d at 1324. This reasoning applies
to the case at bar. The lower court correctly held that Appellants' suit against
the Tribe is barred, but that ruling will be of no consequence if Appellants are
allowed to maintain their suit against the named Tribal Officials ("Officials")
because Appellants' will accomplish indirectly what they could not do directly.
For that reason, this Court should follow the Colville Courts and the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits and hold that sovereign immunity bars Appellants' claim
against the Officials.
Despite strong policy reasons for including tribal officials acting in their
official capacity under the umbrella of the tribe's sovereign immunity, some
courts have allowed a suit to be maintained against tribal officials. However,
those courts did so under unique circumstances that are distinguishable from
the case at hand. For instance, in Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game
of Washington, 433 U.S. 165, 168 (1977), the Washington Department of
Game filed suit against members of the Puyallup Tribe who were fishing
extensively in the Puyallup River. Tribe members claimed they were immune
from the state's conservation laws and the Department sought a declaration
that these laws did indeed bind these members. Id. The court allowed the suit
to proceed against the tribal members, some of whom were officials. Id. at
171. However, the members were sued under state law in their individual
rather than official capacity. Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the
members, sued in their individual capacities just coincidentally happened to
be tribal officials. Id. Therefore, Puyallup is not applicable to the present case
because, unlike Puyallup, Appellants here are seeking to hold the Officials
liable for official, not private, actions.
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In Tenneco Oil Co. v. Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, the Tenth
Circuit allowed suit against tribal officials sued in their official capacities 725
F.2d 572, 575 (10th Cir.1984). However, Tenneco Oil is also distinguishable
from the case at bar. In Tenneco Oil, the complaint alleged that the officers
acted outside the amount of authority that the tribe is capable of bestowing.
Id. at 574. The court reasoned that because the complaint alleged that the tribe
did not have the power to make the law in question, the official must
necessarily have acted outside the scope of his authority, which is one of the
recognized exceptions to sovereign immunity. Id. Appellees do not dispute
that had the Officials acted outside their scope, they would not be entitled to
summary judgment based on their sovereign immunity. However, the Officials
acted within the scope of their authority and Appellants' complaint does not
allege otherwise. (R. at. 1-10.) Therefore, the holding in Tenneco Oil is not
applicable to the present case.
Thus, under applicable case law, for Appellants' to sue the Officials in their
official capacity, they must show one of three things: 1) that the Tribe did not
have the power to delegate membership decisions to the Council, 2) the
Officials were acting outside the scope of their delegated authority, or 3) the
sovereign immunity of the Officials was expressly waived. As discussed
below, Appellants cannot show any of these things. Therefore, this Court
should grant summary judgment to the Officials sued in their official
capacities.
1. The Atokan Tribe Has The Power To Delegate Membership Decisions
To The Tribal Council.
In order for tribal officials to enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity,
they must be acting pursuant to a power properly delegated to them by the
tribe. Stone, 1 CCAR at 22. In addition, it must be a power that the tribe
has the authority to delegate. Id. In other words, if it is a power that the tribe
itself may not exercise then it may not be delegated.to tribal officials. Id.
As discussed infra, Indian tribes are distinct political entities with the power
to regulate their internal and social relations. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 55.
Determining membership is one of the most important matters that Indian
tribes are still allowed to regulate internally. Id. See also Poodry, 85 F.3d at
880 (recognizing that tribes retain certain aspects of sovereignty, including the
power to determine questions of membership). Because "tribal membership
is a sensitive issue closely connected to the sovereignty of the tribe," tribes
must certainly have the power to delegate membership decisions to their tribal
councils and by logical extension, to members of that council. Ordinance 59
Ass'n v. Babbitt, 970 F. Supp. 914, 925 (D. Wyo. 1997).
The case at hand involves a decision by the Council members, acting in
their official capacity, to revise the Tribal Membership Ordinance, and other
[Vol. 27
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Officials, specifically Appellees Elmer Many Horses and Anita Lebeaux, who
carried out official duties in response to the revised Membership Ordinance.
Under applicable case law, the power to determine membership is clearly
within the Tribe's authority to delegate, and holding otherwise would
undermine the Tribe's right to determine issues of membership. Therefore, the
Officials' sovereign immunity cannot be considered waived on the basis that
the Tribe had no authority to delegate such powers.
2. The Tribal Officials Acted Within The Scope Of Their Delegated
Authority.
In order for a tribe's immunity to protect an official, in addition to the
requirement that tribal officials must act only under authority properly
delegated to them, officials must also act within the scope of that authority.
Stone, 1 CCAR at 22. In Village of Hotvela Traditional Elders v. Indian
Health Services, a group of Hopi elders filed an action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against the Hopi Tribal Council. I F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1024
(D. Ariz. 1997). The elders argued, inter alia, that tribal officials acted outside
the scope of their authority, thus waiving their sovereign immunity defense.
Id. at 1028. The court looked at the powers of the council and determined that
because they had acted within the powers set forth in the Hopi Constitution,
none of their actions could be construed as outside the scope of their
authority. Id. at 1028-29.
The Atokan Tribal Council has the power to act for the welfare of the Tribe
and its members, including the power to make membership decisions and to
vote on resolutions. Atokan Const. art I, §2. The Tribe has a strong traditional
religious and cultural bar to marrying outside of the Atokan people. (R. at 4.)
With that in mind, and a desire to preserve the Tribe's bloodline and
resources, James R. Runs Above introduced Tribal Council Resolution 2000-
16, now codified as the ordinance in question. (R. at 5, 13.) As a member of
the Council, he was well within his power to do so. Pursuant to Tribal
tradition, the vote on Resolution 2000-16 was deferred until the next meeting,
when it was voted on and passed. (R. at 5.) Again, all Council members acted
well within the powers delegated them by the Atokan Constitution. Nothing
in Appellants' complaint alleges that the Council members acted outside the
scope of their authority in introducing or voting on the resolution in question.
Membership decisions fall squarely within the Council's powers and in passing
the resolution at issue, the Council followed proper procedure.
Elmer Many Horses is the Director of the Housing Authority and is also
sued in his official capacity. (R. at 3.) As the Director, Mr. Many Horses has
the power to address Tribal housing issues, including evictions. Appellants'
complaint regarding Mr. Many Horses involves two letters he sent, requesting
that either Isaac Walker, a non-member of the Tribe, vacate the home or that
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the family vacate the premises. (R. at 5.) Tribal housing is available only to
enrolled members and their families. (R. at 3.) The term family is neither
defined in the resolution nor in the applicable section of the Atokan Tribal
Code. (R. at 3.) Because the Code is silent as to the definition of family, it
was within Mr. Many Horses' authority, as the Director, to interpret the term
family. It was also within his authority to carry out Atokan Tribal Code
Section 12-1-5, which limits the availability of tribal housing to enrolled
members and their families. This constitutes the extent of Mr. Many Horses'
actions and he was not outside the scope of his authority in doing so. Even
if Mr. Many Horses' interpretation of the term family is incorrect, that alone
does not constitute acting outside the scope of his authority. See Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., 862 F. Supp. at 1002 (holding that "merely being
wrong or otherwise actionable does not take an action outside the scope of
immunity").
Finally, Appellants are also suing Anita Lebeaux, the Enrollment Officer of
the Tribe, in her official capacity. (R. at 3.) As the Enrollment Officer, Ms.
Lebeaux has the power to carry into force any and all laws of the Tribe
pertaining to the enrollment or disenrollment of members. (R. at 3.) Ms.
Lebeaux's only involvement in this case was to send Ms. Many Horses a letter
on April 28, 2000, notifying her that pursuant to Resolution 2000-16, both her
and her son's enrollment were cancelled immediately, and that they were no
longer eligible for tribal benefits. (R. 5-6.) As the Enrollment Officer of the
Tribe, it was clearly Ms. Lebeaux's responsibility to send such a letter. In fact,
not sending the letter would have been in direct conflict with her duties. Ms.
Lebeaux acted within the scope of her power as the Enrollment Officer and
the facts cannot support any other conclusion.
B. The Tribal Officials Did Not Expressly Waive Their Sovereign Immunity.
Because Appellants cannot show that the Officials' waived immunity by
acting under an authority improperly delegated to them or by acting outside
the scope of their power, they must prove an express waiver of immunity.
Section 1-1-6 of the Atokan Tribal Code expressly states that tribal officials
are immune from suits for "liability." (R. at 26-27.) The lower court construes
this language very narrowly, excluding any actions for injunctive or
declaratory relief from the definition of "liability." (R. at 27.)
Appellees respond twofold. First, the definition of "liability" does include
"debts and obligations" as the lower court indicates, but it is not limited
merely to suits seeking monetary damages as the lower court incorrectly holds.
(R. at 27.) "Liability" is a "broad legal term" that has been "referred to as of
the most comprehensive significance, including almost every character of
hazard or responsibility, absolute, contingent, or likely." Black's Law
Dictionary 823 (5th ed. 1979). Therefore, this Court should find that Section
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1-1-6 of the Code's express provision of immunity to Tribal officials extends
to all causes of action, including suits for injunctive and declaratory relief as
sought in the present case.
Second, even if this Court finds that the term "liability" is limited to actions
for monetary damages, the Code's express provision of immunity from such
suits cannot and does not constitute a waiver of the Officials' immunity from
other suits. Expressly stating that Tribal officials are immune from suits for
liability cannot constitute an implied waiver through omission, of immunity
from other kinds of suits. Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians of Fla., 177 F.3d 1212, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that waiver
of immunity regarding one cause of action is not an effective waiver of other
causes of action). In fact, even if it could conceivably be construed as an
implied waiver of immunity from causes of action for injunctive and equitable
relief, it is not sufficient to waive immunity because any waiver of sovereign
immunity must be express not implied. See Stone, I CCAR at 1 18 (waiver
of immunity must be expressed); Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 49 ("It is settled
that a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be une-
quivocally expressed."); Weeks Constr. 797 F.2d at 671 ("a tribe's waiver of
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed"); Niagara Mohawk,
862 F. Supp. at 1001 (suits against tribes are barred by sovereign immunity
"absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation"); Stock W.,
942 F.2d at 664 (same).
IlI. The Tribal Court Clearly Erred When It Denied Summary Judgment to
the Tribal Officials, as Sued in Their Individual Capacities, Because
Neither the Indian Civil Rights Act Nor the Atokan Constitution Provide a
Private Cause of Action Against Individual Tribe Members.
A. The Indian Civil Rights Act Does Not Provide A Private Cause Of Action.
Both tribal and federal courts hold that the Indian Civil Rights Act
("ICRA") does not provide a private cause of action. See Grant, 2 TCAR at
A-42 (holding that "as a matter of law, no cause of action exist[ed] under the
ICRA" as to members of a tribal agency as they were sued in their individual
capacity); Ordinance 59, 970 F. Supp. at 925 (holding that section 1302(8) of
the ICRA speaks only to tribal action and cannot form the basis for a suit
against members of the tribe in their individual capacity).
The Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Means v. Wilson, 522
F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975). In Means, supporters of a candidate for tribal
council president and opponents of the incumbent president brought an action
against tribal council members, some in their individual capacities, under
Section 1302(8) of the ICRA, for damages and injunctive and declaratory
relief on the basis of allegations that tribal election irregularities deprived them
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of their rights to a fundamentally fair election. Id. at 836-37. Reasoning that
the statute states, "[n]o Indian tribe in exercising its powers of self-
government shall .. .", the Eighth Circuit dismissed the individual capacity
claims holding that § 1302 "provides rights only against the tribe and
governmental subdivisions thereof, and not against tribe members acting in
their individual capacities." Id. at 841. (emphasis added). Appellants may cite
Puyallup for the proposition that tribal officials may be sued in their
individual capacity. 433 U.S. at 171. However, Puyallup involved a state law
cause of action, not an action under the ICRA. Id. Thus, Puyallup is not
applicable to the case at bar.
Applicable tribal and federal case law clearly supports Appellees' position
that no private cause of action against individual tribal members exists under
§ 1302(8) of the ICRA. Therefore, this Court should find that Appellants'
cause of action against the Tribal Officials in their individual capacity cannot
be sustained and grant Appellees' motion for summary judgment.
B. The Atokan Constitution Does Not Provide A Private Cause Of Action.
The Atokan Constitution provides the same protections to individual tribe
members as the ICRA; in fact, the two are worded identically. See Atokan
Const. art. V, § 2; 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2001). Because the Atokan Constitution
and the ICRA provide the same rights and protections, Appellants' suit under
the Atokan Constitution against the Tribal Officials sued in their individual
capacities, must fail for the same reasons that it fails under the ICRA. That
is, the Constitution, like the ICRA, provides no private cause of action. Both
speak to tribal action, not individual action. Id. Therefore, this Court should
grant summary judgment to Appellees, sued as individuals, because there is
no private cause of action under the ICRA or the Atokan Constitution.
IV. The Tribal Court Properly Denied the Preliminary Injunction
Based on Appellants Inability to Show Some Probability
of Ultimate Success on the Merits.
The Tribal Court properly consulted Atokan law to determine if Appellant's
situation warranted a preliminary injunction. (R. at 26.) Under Atokan law, the
relevant factors to consider when a party requests a preliminary injunction are;
"(1) [t]he probability of success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm
to the movant; (3) the balance between this harm and the injury that granting
the injunction will inflict on the interested parties; and (4) whether the issuance
of an injunction is in the public interest." Lebeaux v. Good, No. 00-SC-07
(Atokan S. Ct. 2000), quoting Entergy Ark. Inc., v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887,
898 (8th Cir. 2000). Applying these factors, the Tribal Court determined that
Appellants failed to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits or that
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the issuance of the injunction is in the public interest. (R. at 26.) The Tribal
Court based this decision on principles of sovereignty and the ability of an
Indian Nation to determine its own membership. (R. at 26.) The court correctly
determined that because principles of sovereignty bar judicial review of
membership legislation delineating the scope of membership, the Appellants did
not meet the burden necessary for a preliminary injunction. (R. at 26.)
When a preliminary injunction will grant the movant the relief she would
ultimately obtain if successful on the merits, there is a strong burden on the
movant to show that the balance of equities weighs in her favor. Sanbom Mfg.
Co. v. Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co., 997 F.2d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1993).
In the case at hand, granting Appellants' request would restore Appellants'
Tribal memberships revoked by Resolution 2000-16 ("Ordinance") and the right
to live in tribal housing. Because this is essentially the relief Appellants would
receive if they succeeded on the merits of their claim, they are required to
demonstrate at least some probability of prevailing at trial. Dataphase Sys., Inc.
v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (discussing that probability of
success on the merits is not a mathematical calculation, and that the moving
party must demonstrate that there are merits to the case and that justice requires
preserving the status quo until the case is considered). Because under Atokan
law membership ordinances are not subject to judicial review, Appellants are
unable to demonstrate even the slimmest probability of success at trial. The
Tribal Court then considered Appellants' request to enjoin their eviction from
tribal housing. In light of the fact that the court is not vested with the authority
to determine the legality of Council membership legislation, the court
determined that success on the merits of this claim is also unlikely. (R. at 26.)
Section 12-1-5 of the Code reads: "Mribal housing constructed and assigned
under this Resolution shall only be made available to enrolled members of the
Atokan Indian Nation and their families." Atokan Code § 12-1-5. The Tribal
Court correctly determined that under the Ordinance none of the Appellants
qualify as members of the Atokan Nation and as such have no right to continue
living in tribal housing. (R. at 26.) Even if the Tribal Court examined the word
"families" more closely, Appellants are still not entitled to remain in tribal
housing based on principles of construction contained in the Code.
Section 12 of the Code does not define "families," but applying the Code's
Principles of Construction, Appellants do not qualify as "family" of enrolled
tribal members for purposes of tribal housing. Section 1-1-7(b), Principles of
Construction, reads: "[W]ords shall be given their plain meaning.. . ." Atokan
Code § 1-1-7(b). According to Webster's Dictionary, a "family" is "[a] social
unit consisting esp. of a man and woman and their offspring." Webster's 11251
(2nd ed. 1984). While one of the Appellants is the child of an enrolled tribal
member, she is an adult child with a family of her own and falls outside of the
plain meaning definition of a "family."
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Looking at "family" under Section 1- 1-7(c) that reads; "Whenever a term is
defined for a specific part of this Code, that definition shall apply to all parts
of this Code unless a contrary meaning is clearly intended." Atokan Code § 1-
1-7(c). The word "family" is included in the definition of Closely
Related/Immediate Family within the section pertaining to Elections. Atokan
Code § 8-3-3. The individuals designated as family under this provision
include in-laws, nephews, and first cousins. Id. The broad meaning of
"family," utilized to preserve the integrity of tribal elections, is clearly contrary
to the more specific definition of "family" with regards to who is eligible for
tribal housing. See Atokan Code § 8-3-30. The modifiers of closely related and
immediate to the word "family" clearly express intent for the word to be used
in a much broader sense in the election provisions of the Code than in the
Housing provisions. Under the Ordinance, Appellants are neither enrolled
members of the Tribe, nor are they "family" for purposes of determining
housing benefits and have no right to continue living in Tribal housing.
Because the Ordinance and Atokan law deprives Appellants of a right to live
in Tribal housing, the Appellants can not demonstrate a probability of success
on the merits of their claim. Consequently, the court below correctly denied the
motion. (R. at 26.)
Following authority cited by this Court, a denial or grant of a motion for
preliminary injunction is within the broad discretion of the lower court and is
only reversed by the reviewing court for "clearly erroneous factual deter-
minations, an error of law, or an abuse of.. . discretion." Entergy Ark. Inc. v.
Neb., 210 F.3d 887, 898 (8th Cir. 2000) citing United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox
Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 1998). Appellees contend that because
under Atokan law the Tribal Court has no discretion in matters of judicial
review over membership ordinances, the lower court judge did not abuse any
discretion in denying the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Because Atokan
law does not grant the Tribal judiciary the power of judicial review over
membership legislation, the lower court committed no legal error.
V. The Tribal Court Properly Denied the Preliminary Injunction Because
Under Atokan Law the Tribal Court Does Not Have the Authority to Review
Tribal Council Legislation Pertaining to Membership.
A. It Is A Well Established Principle Of Indian Law That Among The Powers
An Indian Nation Holds Is The Right To Determine Its Own Membership.
Indian tribes retain certain inherent powers they possessed as sovereign
nations existing prior to European contact. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). The United States Constitution did not establish the
various tribes and consequently, tribal power as a sovereign does not flow from
the federal government but rather arises from the European concept of
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sovereignty itself. See Fletcher v. Mashantucket (W.) Pequot Tribe, 3 Mash
265 (Mash. Pequot Tribal Ct. 1998) citing Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe,
471 U.S. 195 (1985); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). Because
tribes are not subject to the United States Constitution, that government may
not justify incursions into the area of tribal sovereignty based upon federal
constitutional restrictions. Ordinance 59 Ass'n v. United States Dep't of the
Interior Sec'y, 163 F.3d 1150, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998). However, case law from
the United States interprets the Indian Commerce Clause as granting Congress
plenary power over tribes. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). The
Indian Commerce Clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power...
To Regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl.
3. The United States Supreme Court holds that any exercise of congressional
power over tribal governance must be directly expressed and courts may not
find limitations on tribal self-government where none exist. Santa Clara, 436
U.S. at 60.
The United States Supreme Court acknowledges that tribes are "distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights."
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1831). Among these natural
rights is the power to regulate "internal and social relations." See United States
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-381 (1886). The United States consents that
absent express congressional legislation, tribes have the authority to regulate
internal relations through tribal legislation, including the power to create laws
concerning membership. Martinez v. S. Ute Tribe, 259 F.2d 915 (10th Cir.
1957).
In Santa Clara, the Supreme Court reiterated its position that "[a] tribe's right
to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as
central to its existence as an independent political community." 436 U.S. 49,
72 (1978). In Santa Clara, the Court recognized that unauthorized judicial
intervention in tribal civil matters could "substantially interfere with a tribe's
ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity." Id. The
civil matter at issue in Santa Clara, the power of a tribe to regulate the scope
of its membership, is also what is at issue in the case at hand. Because it is
clearly established that, unless Congress deems otherwise, the power to
determine tribal membership lies with a tribe itself, the Atokan Nation is the
only entity authorized to establish membership requirements.
B. As The Governing Body Of The Atokan Nation, The Tribal Council Is
Vested With All Powers Of The Nation, Including Determining Membership
Requirements, And The Ability To Delegate Such Powers.
Through a vote of Tribal members, the Atokan Indian Nation adopted the
Constitution and By-laws as its governing document. Atokan Const. Cer-
tification of Adoption. In Article I of the Constitution, authority to govern vests
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in an elected Tribal Council. Atokan Const. art. I. As its representative
governing body, the Council acts on behalf of and speaks for the Tribe. See
Wiley v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 2 CCAR 60, 1 45 (Colville Ct. App.
1995).
In order for the Council to properly act for the Tribe, members delegated
certain enumerated powers to the Council in Article V of the Constitution,
including the power to "protect the health, security, and general welfare" of the
Atokan Nation. Atokan Const. art. V, § 1, cl. a. It is only logical that along
with its duties, the Council is vested with the implied power to carry out these
duties. See Wiley, 2CCAR 60 at 46. Among the implied powers necessary
to carry out the duties of the Council is the ability to create legislation aimed
at protecting the security and general welfare of the Tribe. Id.
This broad grant of authority to the Council is restricted only by "statutes or
the Constitution of the United States, . . . express restrictions. .. contained in
this Constitution and attached By-Laws." Atokan Const. art. V, § i. The
United States Constitution does not prohibit the Atokan Nation from deter-
mining its own membership. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 72 (1978). United States
statutes restricting tribal authority to enact legislation are limited. The ICRA
is the most sweeping act of congressional limitation on a tribe's ability to make
"its own ... law ... and to enforce that law in their own forums." Santa
Clara, 436 U.S. at 55-56. Even within the ICRA, no express limitations on a
tribe's ability to govern membership provisions are included. See 25 U.S.C. §
1302 (2001). Without an express intent by Congress to limit a specific tribal
power, the tribe retains that power. See Wiley, at 55.
Within the Atokan Constitution and By-Laws there is a general membership
provision. Atokan Const. art. I, § 2. This section contains no express limitation
on the Council's ability to enact membership legislation designed to protect the
security and general welfare of the Tribe. Because the Tribe, through its
Constitution, delegated broad authority to the Council, and no "express
restrictions" on this authority are found in the Constitution, the Council has the
power to enact legislation regulating membership. Atokan Const. art. V, § 1.
Just as the Tribe delegates its power as a sovereign to the Council, the Council
may delegate power to a Tribal judiciary. Atokan Const. amend. X, § 1.
Because established principles of a sovereign Indian tribe's power to regulate
membership and the authority to delegate such power vests in the Tribe, and
subsequently in the Tribe's governing body, the Council, the membership
decision made by the Council is within their proper authority. The exercise of
this authority through Resolution 2000-16 is proper and unless the power to
review this decision is delegated to the Tribal judiciary, the Tribal Court may
not do so.
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C. Neither the Constitution Nor The Tribal Council Delegated The Power
Of Reviewing Membership Legislation To The Tribal Courts.
Amendment X of the Constitution instructs the Council to establish a
"separate branch of government consisting of . . . the Atokan Tribal
Court .... ." Atokan Const. amend. X, § 1. The duties of the Courts
established by the Council are to "interpret and enforce the laws of the Atokan
Nation as adopted by. the governing body." Id. The judiciary is indeed a
branch of government separate from that of the governing body, but this does
not automatically grant the judicial branch the power of judicial review. See
Satiacum v. Sterud, No. 82-1157, 1982 NAPU 0000001, 18 (Puyallup Nation
Ct. April 23, 1982) (Versus Law) (discussing the fact that in England the
constitutionality of Parliament's actions are not subject to court review). The
power of judicial review in the United States governmental system is justified
in part by the fact that the Constitution establishes a Supreme Court with
specific judicial powers that Congress may neither limit nor expand. See U.S.
Const. art. III. In comparison, the Council established the Atokan judiciary
under authority of the Constitution. See Atokan Const. amend. X, § 1. Thus,
Atokan courts are similar to legislative courts created by the United States
Congress by virtue of that body's power as the sovereign's representative. See
Satiacum, at 22 (VersusLaw). As a court created by the Council, the Tribal
Court, absent a specific grant of other powers, may exercise only these powers
granted it; to interpret and enforce laws enacted by the Council. Because the
Council did not grant the power to review membership legislation to the Tribe's
judiciary, the Tribal Court correctly determined that it has no authority to
review the Ordinance. (R. at 26.)
Appellants may argue that because the Navajo Nation allows for judicial
review of legislation enacted by its tribal council, this persuasive precedent
should allow the Atokan judiciary to do the same. See Bennett v. Navajo Bd.
of Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90, 1990 NANN 0000016, 32 (Navajo
Jan. 12, 1990). This case is not applicable to the case at bar because the
Navajo Nation amended its code to limit and define the powers of the nation's
different branches of government. Bennett, at 37 (VersusLaw). The Atokan
Nation has yet to expand the power of its judiciary through either an ordinance
or a constitutional amendment. Because Appellants have identified no Atokan
or United States law that supports allowing the Tribe's judiciary to review
Council membership ordinances, The Tribal Court correctly determined that it
could not question the validity of the Ordinance. See Hoffman v. Colville
Confederated Tribes, 4 CCAR 4, 108 (Colville Ct. App. 1997).
The Tribal Council is vested with the powers of the sovereign Atokan Indian
Nation including the ability to regulate membership. The Council did not
delegate its power to determine the scope of membership to the judiciary and
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as such, the Tribal Court has no legal authority to review the Ordinance. The
Tribal Court correctly determined that because the probability of Appellant's
success on the merits hinges on whether the Ordinance is valid and the court
has no legal power to review this legislation, the court properly denied
Appellant's petition for a preliminary injunction.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should overturn the decision of the
Atokan Tribal Court and grant Appellees' Request for Summary Judgment
because, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, they are immune from suit.
This Court should uphold the decision of the Atokan Tribal Court to deny
Appellants' request for a preliminary injunction because the power to determine
Tribal membership rests with the Council and that power was not delegated to
the Tribal Court.
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